

SPEECH OF MR. CUSHING,

OF MASSACHUSETTS,

ON THE SUB-TREASURY BILL.

Delivered in the House of Representatives, May 20 and 21, 1840.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MAY 20, 1840.

The House, in Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union, (Mr. BANKS, of Virginia, at the chair,) having taken up the Senate bill, entitled "An act to provide for the collection, safe-keeping, transfer, and disbursement of the public revenue," the bill was read, and the question then being on the first section of it—

Mr. CUSHING submitted a motion to strike out the enacting clause, and said he did this in order to be able, at the present stage in the progress of the bill, to debate its provisions generally; but, before proceeding, he had a suggestion to make to Mr. ATHERTON, who, in the absence of Mr. JONES, the Chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means, appeared to have charge of the bill. This measure, important as it was, and it being, in fact, *the* measure of the existing Administration, had come from the Committee of Ways and Means unaccompanied by any report; and the House, therefore, possessed no knowledge of the views which guided that committee in reporting this project of law. Under these circumstances, if Mr. ATHERTON, or any other gentleman of the committee, was desirous to address the House in behalf of the friends of the bill, and give an exposition of its merits, Mr. CUSHING would yield the floor to him for that purpose. Nay, more, he proffered it; he invited any gentleman to enter into the merits of the bill before he (Mr. C.) spoke of its demerits.

Mr. ATHERTON, for reasons that he assigned, said that he would at present decline to speak. Mr. CUSHING then took the floor to address the House, but gave way to the general wish that the committee should rise and report progress.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MAY 21, 1840.

The House, in Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union, having again taken up the Independent Treasury Bill, Mr. CUSHING proceeded in substance as follows:

Mr. Chairman: This bill, which is a fearfully interesting one of itself, comes before us to-day under circumstances which give to it additional intensity of interest.

The Independent Treasury is an Executive idea and Executive measure. At the opening of the twenty-fifth Congress, with a new President, there met here a new House of Representatives, coming directly from the People, unbiassed and unsophisticated by the influences which emanate from the federal city. This measure was then urged upon Congress by the Executive; and the Senate, that aristocratic branch of Congress, which in these latter times originates many financial acts, seconded the urgency of the Executive; but the House, with its popular feelings fresh upon it, steadily and sternly rejected the bill again and again, and shielded the People from the federal power of the Executive and the Senate.

Nevertheless, the measure, thus repudiated by the People's Representatives, was put in operation by the Executive, *ex mero motu suo proprio*, of his own arbitrary power and discretion, and has been so for three years, in defiance of the will of Congress. Nay, the organ of the Treasury Department here in the last Congress told us, triumphantly told us, in contempt as all of this House as of the People, that this measure was in force, and would so continue, under the present Administration, lament who might, here or elsewhere; and he finds the recompense of his zeal in this matter, not through the suffrages of the People, but through the favor of the President in the shape of a foreign embassy.

And now this Congress, assembled after the President had, for two years, been exerting all the vast power of the Federal Government, and of the party organization of which his Administration is the head, to drill, and persuade, and drive the country into his measure,—now, once again, Congress is called upon, by the voice of the same President and the seconding of the Senate, to pass the bill,—to legalize what the Executive has already done,—to rivet on the People the chains which the Executive has forged and twisted around their limbs in despite of them and of their Representatives. The critical time has come. Decoyed by the lips of the President, the people have dallied in the lap of this Administration, until, Delilah like, it is industriously proceeding to shear the hair of the Samson; and, unless he speedily arouse himself in strength, will hand him over, bound hand and foot, to the Philistines.

When, therefore, in the midst of these circumstances, the bill was brought up last night, I called on the gentleman from New Hampshire, (Mr. ATHERTON,) I called on the Committee

of Ways and Means generally, to rise and justify the measure. In the name of the Opposition here, in the name of the country, in the name of the People of the United States, I invited the friends of the Administration to vindicate its conduct and its purposes. Such a call, at such a time, was a challenge more than an invitation.

And what are the reasons given by the gentleman from New Hampshire (Mr. ATHERTON) for declining such invitation? He says this measure has been several times recommended by the President in his annual messages. Ay, true enough; there has been no want of exhortations on the subject from him; his individual will is too plainly manifest in the matter, not only in originating the measure, and in forcing it upon Congress and the country against the judgment of both, but in the exercise of his power and influence to obtain at last the legal confirmation of his will.

Next, the gentleman refers to past reports. But there has been only one report in the House of Representatives on the subject, that of Mr. Cambreleng in the last Congress; and that was accompanied by the able counter-report of the gentleman from Pennsylvania at my side, (Mr. SERGEANT,) the latter confuting the former, and the antidote going forth to the country along with the poison, neutralizing its venom and destroying its power.

But the gentleman says that this is not a new measure, either to the members of this House or to the country; and that every gentleman present was sent here by his constituents either for or against the bill. Well, suppose it be so, are we then to be *mute* here? I scorn the idea. This is a deliberative assembly of men, and of men having souls of their own; not a body of dumb and blind machines, with no function but that of registering the will of the Executive. Our constituents sent us here to execute their decisions, not those of the President, and to utter and maintain their opinions, as well as to execute their decisions. I know it is not uncommon to hear complaints made of the consumption of time in debate here; but they who utter such complaints are very short-sighted men; they forget that the Federal Government is composed of an association of sovereign States; that the halls of Congress are the great safety-valves of our institutions; that, for the conflicting opinions, and competing interest, and political passions, which waste themselves in debate here, and which by discussion in Congress are conciliated and harmonized, the chief remedy in the other great communities of Christendom is by resort to war.

The remarkable fact remains, then, that we have no affirmative defence of this measure. And it is a most unprecedented fact that a great bill like this should be thrown haughtily and unconcernedly upon the table of the House, as being a law which the Executive demands, and which, in humble obedience to him, there is a party ready and strong enough to pass, right or wrong. We do not, say the friends of the Administration—(and is not that equivalent to saying we dare not or cannot?)—attempt to justify the measure affirmatively, upon satisfactory arguments. For the gentleman from New Hampshire, in conclusion, gravely puts it to me to proceed, contrary to the natural course of debate, and show cause why this bill ought not to pass. I, however, shall not shrink from that challenge.

There is a still more singular fact in the circumstances which now surround us; and it is, that we are now asked to legalize this financial experiment of the President's after it has actually been tried and has failed.

This scheme of policy has been in operation, by Executive will in defiance of Congress, for three years. It is the measure, and the only measure, of his Administration; or rather it is emphatically *his* measure. One of the ablest of his advocates, the Democratic Review, tells us:

"The great event of Mr. Van Buren's Administration, by which it will be hereafter known and designated, is the divorce of Bank and State in the fiscal affairs of the Federal Government, and the return, after half a century of deviation, to the original design of the Constitution."

So that Mr. Van Buren is not only wiser than all the present generation, but wiser than those conscript fathers of the Republic by whom the Constitution was framed and the machinery of the Federal Government set in motion. Regardless of their example, and of the monitory experience of half a century, he resolved to try his experiment, and he has tried it. Or rather, it is one of two kindred experiments. General Jackson's experiment, the pet-banks system, like this one, was put in operation by Executive will in defiance of Congress; like this, it was in operation for three years before it was legalized; and it exploded in a year after the act for its legalization was extorted from Congress, as this may, involving the Government and the country in common dismay and confusion.

And what has, thus far, been the effect of the two? This we have seen too clearly, in the never-ceasing agitations of currency, commerce, and business of all sorts; in a vast number of individual bankruptcies; in two suspensions of cash payments by the banks, one partial, the other universal; in the prostration of productive industry in all its departments; in the general reduction of prices, especially of cotton, corn, and labor; in a word, in the congelation of the current of the country's prosperity, the paralysis of its industrial energies, an ossification as it were, at its heart. Such have been the disastrous results of these financial experiments of the Executive; the last of which, in the face of all these facts, Congress is now called on to adopt and to legalize.

And we are called upon to do this at a time when the People, weary of these empirical

periments on their welfare and repose, have arisen in the majesty of their might to rebuke the experimenters, and to cashier that Administration which, in the blind pursuit of its own party interests, disregards those of the nation. Let not the friends of the Administration suppose that the country is agitated for nothing; nor seek to lay that flattering unction to their souls. It is not a ripple on the surface of the waves, but a tempestuous tossing of the deep sea, which you witness. The masses are in motion. It is the upheaving of the vast ocean itself, with that tremendous ground-swell from its uttermost depths, which forebodes, and marks the unwithstandable power of, the coming onset of the earthquake, and which is about to overwhelm you with the deluge of its waters. If the People cannot reform the purposes of the Administration, and make these consonant to their wishes and interests, they can and will reform the Administration itself.

Such a bill, coming before us under such circumstances, deserves a full and deliberate examination upon its precise merits; more especially as the discussions of it in the House hitherto have been either partial and hurried, or incidental only; and I propose now to subject it to a rigorous and complete scrutiny. But, before commencing on this, I desire to forestall any attempts, on the other side, to stifle debate by the clamor concerning the appropriation bills, which is so common in this House and in the newspapers.

The Administration majority in the House have decided to take up this bill first, to the postponement of those general appropriation bills which remain to be acted on. They have made this decision upon the precise question proposed by the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. WISE,) who moved to take up the navy appropriation bill in preference to this. The appropriation bills are of admitted general importance; so much so that one of the standing rules of the House gives to them a precedence over all other bills. When the civil and diplomatic appropriation bill was on its passage, we heard continual complaints in the House concerning the injury to the public service, and the wrong to the public servants, which was inflicted by the delay of the appropriations for the civil, naval, military, and miscellaneous services of the Government. The Globe was loud in its exhortations on the subject. If the exigency for the passage of these bills was so great a month ago, it must be greater now, as it notoriously is; and it is a violation of duty to the Government and the country to postpone these bills. On the other hand, this bill can well enough wait. The system which it is intended to legalize is practically in force now. It can matter nothing to the Government and the country whether that act of legalization take place a month sooner or a month later. Of course, this bill is called up now for party reasons merely;—to endeavor to help the falling fortunes of the Administration by a show of courage, or to satisfy the importunity of a certain class of its friends, discontented to see this bill remain so long as it has in the House untouched, or to meet the taunts of the Opposition on the same point. For some such object, also, though the bill remained on the Speaker's table for weeks after it came from the Senate, uncommitted even, yet the friends of the Administration, for nothing else but idle exhibition, have recently consumed the time of the House with motions to suspend the rules, and take it up out of order, on days when it was morally certain that the House would not agree to suspend the rules for that purpose. Now, they have at length got it up, postponing the interests of country to those of party. Let us hear nothing from the friends of the Administration, therefore, in this debate, of the delay of the appropriation bills, as an argument to stifle or cut off debate. The delay is theirs. They alone are responsible for it. They cannot expect this bill to pass without being largely discussed. If they do, they mistake. And if at any time hereafter they complain of the delayed appropriation bills, I say to them, and the country will say,—The fault is yours, and the remedy is at any moment in your hands; for the same majority which took up this bill can lay it aside, and take up the appropriation bills in its stead, to resume it when they shall have been passed and sent to the Senate.

This bill is commonly called by its friends "the Independent Treasury bill." I shall not quarrel with its name. Its sponsors may christen it as they please; and if to the name of "Sub-Treasury" they prefer that of "Independent Treasury," they are welcome to use it, for aught I care. It is a bill to give to the Government an independent place of deposit for the public treasure,—a place of deposit independent, not of banks only, but of the People. This is one of its provisions. But it has another provision; and that is, to give to the Government an independent currency in all its dealings, as well as independent depositories of the public treasure; independent, in one case and in the other, of the whole People of the United States. These two are the main objects of the bill, provided for in the first and nineteenth sections, namely, Government depositories, and a Government currency; the other twenty-six sections of the bill being subsidiary to the execution of these two.

The bill, which embodies this scheme, begins appropriately by repealing sundry clauses of the Constitution of the United States. In the first section it is enacted that "certain rooms, vaults, and safes," in the new Treasury building, "are hereby constituted and declared to be the Treasury of the United States." Is the Treasury of the United States a local thing, a building, a vault, a safe? If so, as it is a universal truth that a true definition may be substituted for the thing defined, then is Mr. Woodbury the Secretary of a certain vault or safe in the Treasury building. You might as well declare the arsenal to be the War Department, or a ship or a cannon the

Navy Department, or the great seal to be the State Department. The whole enactment is absurd and puerile, this attempt to *localize* the Treasury of the United States; but when the enactment is compared with the Constitution, it is worse than merely absurd and puerile, it is plainly unconstitutional. The Constitution says that "no money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law;" and that certain duties "shall be for the use of the Treasury of the United States." It is evident that these expressions do not signify a *place*, but rather an abstract legal entity. And the bill itself, in other parts of it, proceeds on the same idea; for though, if the vaults of the Treasury building be the Treasury of the United States, all appropriations must be drawn therefrom, yet the bill provides elsewhere for drawing appropriations out of other places of deposit all over the United States.

In discussing the numerous and complicated details of the bill and its various parts, I propose, for the sake of perspicuity, to consider it—first, as a fiscal measure only; that is, in its relation to the Treasury;—and, secondly, as a measure of state policy; that is, in its relation to the People.

It is known to the House that, when the idea of this scheme was broached in Congress in 1834, the Administration was decidedly hostile to it. The friends of the Administration here spoke and voted against it in a body. The Globe declared that the effect of the scheme would be to expose the public treasure to be plundered by a hundred hands where one could not reach it before. The present Secretary of the Treasury condemned in strong terms the idea of entrusting the public treasure to the keeping of individual agents of the United States. And the plan was taken up in 1837 as an afterthought. Yet, afterthought as it is, and repudiated as it had been by the Secretary of the Treasury, where, think you, it is, that he goes to find the *origin* of the scheme? To any of the trusted names of the Democracy? No, indeed; but to that able man, who is to the friends of the Administration in this House the very by-word of horror, namely, Alexander Hamilton. Yet see how curiously Mr. Woodbury covers this up,—how adroitly he insinuates the fact, without speaking out the name. In the Treasury report of September, 1837, he says:

"The other system to which the attention and consideration of Congress are respectfully invited, is a new organization by means of commissioners or receivers general, to gather the collections to more central points, &c. Such an organization might be at only three or four of the most important points, or it might be made more extensive, &c. This could be arranged in all important particulars substantially in the manner which is now in very successful practice in some of the most enlightened and opulent Governments of Europe, and *as was urgently recommended by this Department as early as 1790.*"

That is, Mr. Woodbury seizes upon a temporary idea of Mr. Hamilton's, the mere imperfect suggestion which occurred to him in the outset of the Government, when we had neither treasure nor fiscal agents of any sort, nor much else but debts, and cites this in support of the present measure. He might have bethought him of the beautiful idea of Burns, that Nature tried her 'prentice hand on man, and made woman afterwards, when experience had taught skill. For, in this reference to Hamilton's authority, Mr. Woodbury refuses the master-workman fiscal machinery which the Father of his country adopted, which experience approved for many years, and under which the country had long prospered; and proposes, instead of it, to take the first imperfect instruments, on which Hamilton did but try his "'prentice hand," sending us, for the idea of his "sub-treasurers," to Alexander Hamilton's unfinished and rejected rough draught.

Looking at the bill in its light of a new fiscal machinery only, the first question is, whether the Treasurer of the United States, receivers general, treasurers of mints, collectors, land office receivers, and postmasters, who are made by this bill the sole depositories of the public moneys, are in all respects the best possible fiscal agents and depositories of the United States.

Are they, as compared with banks for instance, the *safest* depositories?

For the *security* of the public money in the hands of its agents under this bill, the Administration proposes to rely (in addition to the integrity of the officers) upon,—1st. bonds; 2d. inspections; 3d. penal provisions.

Every thinking man must admit that it will be impossible to secure the public treasure by the suretyship bonds which the bill calls for. Individuals cannot give adequate bonds for the millions to pass through their hands or to remain in their custody. The President assumes that only five millions will be on hand at any time. I shall disprove this hereafter, but for argument's sake I also assume this at present. Taking the whole sum at five millions, a large sum will be at New York, for example. Can the receiver general at New York give good security for three, two, or even one million of dollars? We know he cannot. There are few men in the country of sufficient wealth to render their bond good to that amount; of such men there is probably not one who would be willing to become security for a receiver general. We know how the thing must and will be done. The receiver general will obtain the signatures of as many friends as he can, *each* to be responsible to a certain amount. And if the principal becomes a defaulter, the sureties will, most of them, devise means to convey their property from the Government, and thus to escape. Or perhaps they will come here and pray for an act of Congress for their relief; as the sureties of Swartwout have done this very session. So that, on the whole, the suretyship must be conceded on all hands to be but very imperfect at best as a means of protecting the Government.

Next, the bill provides for the supervision of the depositories by the Treasury Department

But it is obviously impossible for the Government to have conusance of the conduct and personal habits of numerous agents scattered all over the Union. The ingenuity of fraud will outstrip the vigilance of the Government. Special or itinerating agents may be sent, without notice, to inspect the depositories; but how easy it is by the artful arrangement of accounts to deceive such inspectors!

But whatever security the Government may have, by these or any other means, with individual depositories, it has identically the same in the case of banks, and something more. Personal integrity is a thing not peculiar to Government officers on the one hand, nor to bank officers on the other; nor is the want of it peculiar to either. In each case the individuals trusted are men, and subject to the infirmities of the human condition, and alike capable of the breach of trust and of crime. In each case the person offending may be arrested and punished for his criminal acts. In the case of bank officers, as of the officers created by this bill, bonds are taken to make good any defalcation of which they may be guilty. To one, as to the other, a system of supervision by public agents is applicable. But, while in all these particulars the two cases are perfectly parallel, or, at any rate, there is no advantage in favor of special Government depositories, it is obvious to see that other and great advantages, on the score of safety, remain altogether peculiar to banks, as they have been constituted hitherto, under charters, either from the States, or from Congress. For, in addition to all the security which is common to the two modes of deposit, a special or a bank depository, the depositor in bank has the ample and complete security of *the capital stock of the bank*; the Government has the inspection of the directors and stockholders, in addition to its own; and, above all, the bank cannot abscond. Its officers may abscond, but its capital stock remains fixed by its charter in the State which establishes it. Your Swartwouts may, on the approaching discovery of their defalcation, take passage for England by the first packet, but not so the Bank of New York, or the Massachusetts Bank.

Upon the whole reason of the thing, therefore, I hold it to be clearly shown that bank depositories are, in their nature, safer than individual agents as depositories. And the unbiassed and spontaneous action of individuals in the management of their own private affairs, where no party influences intervene, or, if they do, are overcome by the consideration of private interest, confirms the conclusion; for who, that is in the way to have large sums of money on hand, keeps it in his own safe or vault, or in the custody of his clerk or other agent? No man does this willingly. Every body sees, that, if he is known to have large sums of money in his house and in his own custody, habitually, he exposes himself to robbery or theft; and that, whatever confidence he may place in the integrity of a clerk or cash-keeper of his own, money deposited in bank is much more securely disposed of, and he acts accordingly.

And the history of the Treasury of the United States furnishes a great body of facts to the same point. In a Treasury report which I have before spoken of, Mr. Woodbury elaborately argues, and conclusively proves, from the experience of the Government, the superior safety of bank depositories over all others. Nay, in that document he covers the whole question; for he says that individual agents will probably be found "less responsible, safe, convenient, and economical." As a specimen of the spirit and reasoning of that document, I give the following extracts:

"It is a singular fact, *in praise of this description of public debtors*, the selected BANKS, that there is not now due on deposits, from the whole of them which have ever stopped payment, from the establishment of the Constitution to the present moment, a sum much beyond what is now due to the United States from one mercantile firm that stopped payment in 1825 or 1826, and of whom [which] ample security was required, and supposed to be taken, under the responsibility of an oath. If we include the whole present dues to the Government from discredited banks, *at all times and of all kinds, whether as depositories or not, and embrace even counterfeit bills, and every other species of unavailable funds in the Treasury*, they will not exceed what is due from two such firms." * * *

"These circumstances, with the preference in case of failure belonging to depositors and holders of their bills over the stockholders, united with the security, if not priority, given to the Government, render them, in point of safety, generally *much superior to individual agents of the United States*." * * *

"It is gratifying to reflect that the credit given by the Government, whether to bank paper or bank agents, has been accompanied by smaller losses, in the experience under the system of State banks in this country at *their worst period, and under their severest calamities*, than any other kind of credit the Government has ever given in relation to its pecuniary transactions."

These paragraphs of Mr. Woodbury's report contain statements of *facts* which it is impossible to contradict. Nor have these facts, so far as I know, ever since been denied, notwithstanding the change in the policy of the Administration. It is true, a Treasury document has come out this session, which is calculated, on a hasty inspection, to mislead the mind into some conclusions adverse to those of the Secretary's old report; but which, more carefully examined, confirms it in all its parts.—(Ex. Doc. No. 10.)

This document comprises a table of the amount of loss to the Government in successive periods by the non-payment of custom-house bonds; and this it is obvious has nothing to do with the present question, which is a question, not of debt, but of breach of trust on the part of agents of the Government.

Another table in the same document gives the losses by deposit banks as follows:

Year.	Losses by deposit banks.	Year.	Losses by deposit banks.
From 1789 to 1812, inclusive.	None appearing on the books.	1825	\$130,244
		1826	None left unpaid.
		1827	
		1828	
1813		1829	None.
1814		1830	None.
1815		1831	\$17,520
1816		1832	None.
1817	\$77,027	1833	None.
1818	None left unpaid.	1834	\$9,415
1819	36,966	1835	None.
1820	None left unpaid.	1836	None.
1821	\$327,530	Total from 1789 to 1836, inclusive, . . . \$894,722	
1822	34,398		
1823	56,929		
1824	204,693		

That is to say, the whole sum which the Treasury has lost by deposit banks, from the beginning of the Government to 1837, is but about two-thirds of what has been lost under this Administration by a single collector of the customs in New York. The same table undertakes to give an estimate of the amount the Government lost, chiefly during the last war with Great Britain, by the receipt of bank paper; but that question belongs to another branch of the subject.

The same document contains a table of the loss of the Government by disbursing officers, and a table of loss by collecting officers, in each case, from 1789 to 1836 inclusive, which present the following results:

1. Disbursing Officers.		2. Collecting Officers.	
Aggregate amount of loss in civil department,	\$898,023 59	Aggregate amount of loss by collectors of the customs,	\$1,198,979 92
Aggregate amount of loss in military and naval, -	4,058,549 97	Aggregate amount of loss by collectors of internal revenue and direct tax, -	442,265 76
	<u>\$4,956,573 56</u>	Aggregate amount of loss by receivers of sales of lands, -	397,304 14
Number of defaulters, civil department, -	244		<u>\$2,038,549 81</u>
Number of defaulters, military and naval, -	2,516		
	<u>2,760</u>	Number of defaulters in the custom-house, -	87
Loss per head, civil department, -	\$3,680	Number of defaulters in the internal revenue, &c. -	243
Loss per head, military and naval, -	1,613	Number of defaulters in the public land receipts, -	27
	<u>\$1,795</u>		<u>357</u>
		Loss per head among collectors of the customs, -	\$13,781
		Loss per head among collectors of internal revenue, &c. -	1,820
		Loss per head among receivers of public lands, -	14,715
			<u>\$5,737</u>

Be it observed, that these tables do not include the large defalcations, which have occurred or come to light under the administration of Mr. Van Buren. And yet here we have seven millions of loss by defaulting Government agents, to contrast with less than one million of loss in the same period by deposit banks; those defalcations occurring in every branch of the public service, but being especially large in the disbursements of the army and navy. And this document, therefore, the latest on the subject, completely substantiates the statements made by Mr. Woodbury in his former report, and confirms, in the most striking manner, the conclusions to which I had arrived by general argument, in proving, by the actual experience of the Government, the superior safety of banks over individuals as the fiscal agents of the Treasury.

Without enlarging to enforce this argument further, (though I might adduce a multitude of other facts from the experience of the Government to the same point,) I proceed to another fiscal question, and that is, the probable expense to the Government of this experiment of an Independent Treasury.

I call the attention of the House to the fact that, though this bill makes the necessary appropriations for carrying the new system of deposit for the public moneys into effect, yet it is impossible to judge from any thing expressed in the bill what precise amount of appropriation it may require. We see, on the face of it, the creation of sundry new officers with large salaries, but we do not know, nor can we, in this early stage of the experiment, how many additional officers it may call for. One thing I venture to predict, that it will prove impossible to conduct all the machinery of the new system without the appointment of many additional officers not mentioned in the bill; and that a host of new clerks and special agents will follow in the train of the recei-

ers general, and of the important duties here imposed upon the treasurers of the several mints and collectors of the customs, as well as upon the superior officers of the Treasury. What appointments are here set down in so many words are but the entering wedge to others. And so it is with the new sub-treasuries to be constructed, and the safes and vaults in the various existing public edifices which are to be used as sub-treasuries. The bill itself makes a specific appropriation for the purchase of sites and the construction of new buildings at certain points. Does any body imagine that the expense is to end here? We know it will not. Every day's experience shows that the course is to ask in the outset for barely money enough to lay the foundations of a building, and then to call for more and more yearly to continue and complete the work. Thus it has been with the great freestone, marble, and granite palaces which are now in the course of construction here and elsewhere, to be used in part as places of deposit for the public money, and one of which is by this bill declared to be the Treasury of the United States. These magnificent edifices, these temples to Mammon, these shrines of the gold-god Plutus, whose worship it seems to be one of the special objects of the Treasury to advance, are to be essential parts of the new fiscal plan. How much, I say, all this is to cost, we are nowhere told; and the bill disguises all this in a sweeping clause, placing the Treasury at the unlimited discretion of the President for the expenditure of whatever money, more or less, he may choose to apply to the execution of his darling experiment. All this undisclosed and unknown expense is to be incurred to obtain new places of deposit and deposit agencies, instead of those which have heretofore cost the Government nothing.

Another fiscal consideration is the comparative convenience of the new plan; for Mr. Woodbury, in his last annual report, relies much on the alleged convenience of the plan to the Government.

This alleged convenience consists, in the first place, of the pretended facilities of transferring its funds from the place of receipt to the place of expenditure. I deny that the system affords any such facilities. On the contrary, unless the Government has as many sub-treasuries scattered all over the country as there are banks in the several States, the latter will continue to be, as they always have been, the most convenient channels for the transfer of credits from place to place by the negotiation of drafts. In this matter, as in that of deposits, every man's experience and conduct in his own affairs contradicts the theory of the Secretary of the Treasury.

In addition to this pretended advantage of the plan, much has been said, at all times, of the inconvenience of having the Government subject to be deprived of the use of its funds by the failure of deposit banks, or the suspension of cash payments on their part, or the funds being discounted on by these banks, and so not capable of being repaid at a moment's warning; and the experience of the year 1837 is referred to in support of this view of the subject. To which it is obvious to reply, in the first place, that no such difficulty ever occurred under the fiscal agency of either of the two Banks of the United States; in the second place, that individuals are much more likely to fail, or to withhold the public funds in their hands, than the banks of the States, as I have already demonstrated by Treasury documents; and, finally, that so far as it may be the object of the Government to guard against any possible inconvenience from this source, by reason of the money being used by the banks, it is as easy to enact that it shall not be discounted on, or otherwise used, by bank agents as by individual agents, and as easy to secure the observance of the prohibition by penal provisions in one case as in the other.

And upon this branch of the question the conclusion seems to me irresistible, that, in a mere fiscal point of view, looking only to the naked, narrow consideration of what kind of deposit agency is best for the Government as a *Government*, the new plan is less safe, less economical, and less convenient for the Treasury than the old one, which a half century's experience has sanctioned and approved.

What may be the operation of the new plan upon the *resources* of the Treasury is a different, but a very important fiscal question. If, as I shall endeavor to prove in discussing other branches of the question, the effect of the financial policy of the Administration, considered in all its parts, should be to cripple commerce and check production, will it not, in reducing the business of the country, reduce in the same proportion the resources of the Treasury? And if the immediate resources of the Treasury be reduced, what is the remedy to be? Either you must impose additional taxes by augmenting the rates of duty in the tariff, or you must borrow money to meet the daily wants of the Government. This result is not mere speculation. It has been reached already; for already the Government is in debt. I know that, in the debates in this House upon the Treasury Note Bill, the friends of the Administration denied that those notes constitute a debt. But in the Senate this point was given up. And it had long before been given up at the Treasury,—for, in the various tables of the public expenditures which have recently come to Congress from the Treasury Department, the Treasury notes are expressly treated as a *public debt*, and classed in the same column with the old funded debt. This is the only common-sense view of the subject. Already, therefore, the financial policy of the Administration has acted seriously on our fiscal resources, foreshadowing to us the greater evil of the same kind to come, either of new debt or new taxes, to supply the necessities of the Treasury.

But the Secretary of the Treasury, notwithstanding all these considerations against the em-

ployment of individual Government agents as the depositories of the Treasury, in the face of all the adverse experience of the Government on the subject, and of his own express and emphatic declarations of his own convictions in favor of bank depositories—in spite of all this, the Secretary, in that same sentence in which he covertly seeks to screen the new scheme by throwing over it the mantle of that federalist of federalists, Alexander Hamilton—monarchist, I believe some gentlemen call him—in the same sentence the Secretary of the Treasury claims approbation for the scheme, because it is actually practised by some of the monarchies of Europe. His words are: “in the manner *which is now in very successful practice in some of the most enlightened and opulent Governments of Europe*, and as was urgently recommended by this Department as early as 1790.” How much have we not heard this session concerning the *federalism* of the present Opposition, and the *monarchism* of the old federalists! How much research and learning have been expended by the friends of the Administration on this controversy about names! And yet this Administration, which, by a vain dispute of words, would arrogate to itself the title of democratic, is thus found, in respect of that only thing which constitutes its peculiar political creed, clothing itself in the cast-away garment of Alexander Hamilton, and citing the example of the monarchs of Europe to show how well the garment befits the Government of the United States. To afford the proof of which, the Senate, that natural and proper ally of Executive power against the people, has, in the last Congress as well as this, drawn from the Treasury Department two very curious and significant documents on the fiscal regulations of foreign countries; and the Independent Treasury, with all its adjuncts, is gravely recommended to us by the example of the despotisms, parental or tyrannical, which control the chief part of continental Europe, to say nothing of Turkey in Asia, and of Cuba!

I concede that the history of other nations may well be studied by us; that sometimes an important fact, a valuable idea, may be derived from them; and that it would be weak and narrow to refuse a useful invention or practice merely because it originated in a foreign monarchy. In science, literature, and the useful arts, we may at all times learn much from the old states of Europe. But I am jealous of all European examples in matters of Government. In this respect, I would sooner look to Europe for things to shun than for things to imitate. Our institutions, political and social, are totally different from theirs. Ours is a Government, not of new forms only, but of new principles also. In addition to this, our peculiar continental and territorial condition tends to separate our case still further from that of any European States. And I, having such prepossessions, am not inclined to think any better of any plan of governmental policy, because of its being practised in Europe. But, as the Treasury Department has been at great pains to obtain, through our consulates and legations abroad, a large body of information on this subject, to justify its particular policy, I will, in all fairness, examine the facts to see how far they countenance the scheme of the President.

Of the European states, some deposite in bank, and some do not. The examples, therefore which this document affords are both ways. On the first inspection of the document, there is one line of distinction apparent in it, which immediately strikes the eye, and it is, that while European Governments, like Great Britain and France, which have something of constitutional freedom in their institutions, which have elected legislative assemblies—Governments which are at the very top of the scale of modern civilization—while Governments such as these deposite in bank and receive bank paper, others, which have no representative assemblies, nay, some which are at the very bottom of the scale of civilization, and but one degree removed from absolute barbarism, such as Turkey, do not. This general fact certainly does not tend to impress the mind very favorably towards the plan of repudiating bank depositories. Though it may be premature to decide the question upon this single fact, yet certainly it is a fact pregnant with inference and meaning.

On looking further, it will be found necessary to distinguish between the question,—what shall be the Government depository, and what the medium of receipts and payments on the part of the Government? For instance, not a few Governments in Europe, especially the heavily indebted ones, make large issues of *Government paper*, which performs many of the offices of money, and in some cases is an express substitute for bank paper. Prussia and Saxony are examples of this. In the case of such Governments, it is a secondary question where they deposite the paper received for public dues, that paper being *Government paper*. And their example has no application to us, unless it is our intention also to be overwhelmed with public debt, to continue to anticipate our revenue, and to make large issues of Government paper for money.

Nor is the *place* of deposite a matter of much consequence in this relation, if the receipts and payments of the Treasury be made in the *same medium*, and that medium be either Government paper or bank paper. The Government may, if it choose, lock up the notes of a bank in its vaults forever; that does no injury to the bank, but the contrary. Therefore the case of Governments, which, though they make use of Government agents as depositories, yet receive and pay bank paper, such as Austria, Denmark, and Belgium, goes but little way towards sustaining the views of the Administration.

In this document we have, beside the great monarchies of Europe, information concerning

the states like the cities of Hamburg and Bremen, which are of no application, because a particular system might answer well enough in the narrow limits of a single insignificant city, and yet be very unfit for a great country like ours.

Nor can we derive any instruction from the South American republics, whose practice is detailed in this document; for some of them receive bank paper, some of them specie, and others Government paper; their financial condition being, in general, like that of the United States in the days of the Confederation and of Continental paper money, and of no sort of use as a guide to the United States at the present conjuncture.

And the Administration, not content with sending us to Turkey to learn how a free people should be governed, lays before us the examples of the *European colonies* in America, such as Halifax, Jamaica and Cuba. Truly a profitable study for the People of the United States! And yet the case of Cuba, not a Government, not an independent state, but the mere dependency of Spain, without institutions of any sort, with scarce the common benefit of decent roads, or any thing else to indicate material prosperity,—a solitary Spanish island under the delegated despotism of Spanish Captains-General and Spanish garrisons,—this case, so monstrously unapposite to that of the United States, has been much dwelt upon by the advocates of the Administration, as countenancing their scheme of a Government currency and Government sub-treasurers.

If any citizen of the United States wishes to see this country reduced to the territorial dimensions or the social or political condition of Cuba, I shall not contend with him; he is quite welcome to enjoy his opinions on that head unmolested. Leaving that question, therefore, to others, it is sufficient for me to say that, so long as the United States consist of a confederation of States covering a continent, so long as the United States are an independent Republic, so long as the citizens of the several States are freemen having rights of their own and a country of their own to be governed for itself,—so long the example of the political system of Cuba will be the very last deserving to be quoted for the imitation of the United States. I like that of Turkey or of the Barbary States better; for these at least are Governments, not dependent colonies; and if their ruler be a despot, and they grow weary of him, they have at worst the constitutional check of the dagger, by which they may rid themselves of one tyrant, and try the experiment of another. Not so with a little colony such as Cuba, garrisoned by a foreign army, and ruled by a foreign viceroy.

But they, who quote upon us the hard-money currency of Cuba, think nothing, it would seem, of political, social, or moral questions; they look to the single fact that Cuba produces a large quantity of sugar for exportation; and that is evidence, undoubtedly, of a certain degree of material prosperity. Whether that prosperity would not be greater under other circumstances—whether the combination of dependent colony, forced labor, and specie currency, does in truth present the *beau ideal* of political, social, and financial perfectibility, is a question which it would be interesting to discuss.

But I shall content myself, at present, with denying the premises of the argument. Cuba does not, in fact, possess a stable currency of intrinsic specie value. Nor does the specie currency, which the island has, such as it is, constitute the chief medium of purchase and sale for her exports and imports. According to the best information which I can obtain, the facts in this matter are as follows: Of coined currency in Cuba, the chief is the Spanish gold *onza*, or doubloon and its parts. This coin is properly, and according to its original rated value, equal to sixteen Spanish dollars; and the doubloons of recent coinage in independent South America pass for no more in Cuba, though of about the same intrinsic value as the old one, which, by *Government order*, passes for *seventeen* Spanish dollars of *artificial* or *forced value*. Of course, the old Spanish doubloon is a mere piece of merchandise out of Cuba; and whenever that coin reaches the United States, in the course of our trade with the West Indies, or with South America, it goes at once to the broker to be sold at a premium for the artificial demands of Cuba. So much for the gold currency of Cuba. Nor is the silver currency any better. This consists, not of Spanish dollars, nor of smaller silver coins at their intrinsic value; for such coins will not stay in the island along with doubloons rated at seventeen dollars, and there is no *pillared pistareens*, worth only twenty cents, but passed in Cuba for twenty-five cents. And many of these coins are, moreover, grossly adulterated. Thus, very recently, a large amount of Isabella headed pistareens, greatly adulterated, were sent from Spain to be circulated in Cuba. That is to say, though Cuba has no bank paper currency, but a specie currency instead, that currency has either a stable nor a true intrinsic value. Add to which, that specie is the currency in small dealings only. Cargoes of sugar in Cuba, as every body knows, are purchased, not with doubloons nor with pistareens, but with bills on England, drawn either upon previous credits or upon the consignment of the cargo. Do the People of the United States want to be blessed, then, with such a blissful currency of overrated gold and silver as that of Cuba? Impossible.

There is one European Government which, though not mentioned in this document, is relied upon very much in argument by the friends of the Administration, and that is Holland; and it I believe, the only independent State of whose example they do say much. That Government, we are told, collects its revenue in specie, and keeps it in the hands of its own individual

agents. If it be so, if (which I do not believe) the public treasure is continually transported to and fro, from Amsterdam or Rotterdam to the Hague, or kept locked up in vaults, the example proves nothing to us: for a fiscal machinery, which works well in a small kingdom like Holland, equal in territory only to the smaller among the States of this Union, and an old country, where money capital is in excess and every thing else wanting, may be very inadequate, insufficient, and injurious for a Republic, so extensive in territory and so various in wants and resources as the United States. It costs but a few hours of time, and but little money, to convey specie from Amsterdam or Rotterdam to the Hague. It would take as many weeks to make the same transfers from one extremity of the United States to the other. The example, therefore, seems to me to have no weight, even conceding the premises assumed.

But the commercial business of Holland is not done in specie. Amsterdam has its bank. Private bankers abound, and a paper currency, in the form of orders or checks, is used in the internal commercial dealings of the great cities.

And, if it were otherwise, to what Holland is it that gentlemen refer us? Is it that Holland from which the ancestors of a part of the people of the United States came, and to which their descendants in New York may look back with just and honest pride? Is it Holland in the days of her commercial and political glory—that Holland which repelled the armies of Spain, which carried her conquests into the East and West Indies, which covered every sea with her ships, and which made the whole world tributary as it were to the little spot of earth extorted by its industrious, frugal, and hardy people from the ocean itself? Is it that Holland which defied the power of Louis XIV, and contended on equal terms with Great Britain? Holland of the days of De Ruyter, and of Van Tromp, sweeping the English channel with the broom at his mast-head? Holland of the days of the Republic, and of the old Bank of Amsterdam? No, it is not that Holland, to which the friends of the Administration send us; but Holland, shorn of her splendor and her power; Holland in her decay; Holland at the feet of that Stadtholder family with which De Witt and Barnevelt struggled; Holland become at last the mere appanage of the House of Nassau:—this is the Holland to which the Administration points us, as one more of the European royal models for the United States to copy.

If the Administration must have royal models for imitation, why does it overlook the case of France,—which not only receives bank paper, but makes deposits in the Bank of France? If we are to copy monarchies, let us copy great and liberal ones. France has none of this blind hostility against either a bank of France or joint-stock banks; and is not her example as good as that of Holland? I may be told that in France the bank notes issued by the bank and received by the Government are not of denominations so small as the banks of this country issue; and that accordingly France has more specie in circulation than the United States; but that is a question of degree, not of principle. What gentlemen propose in this bill is the proscription of banks, not the regulation or reform of them. If it were the latter, we should have little cause of difference.

Once more: if the Administration must needs have the benefit of some royal example to justify its policy—if it must go to the old monarchies of Europe to learn how to conduct the fiscal affairs of the Government—why does it overlook our fatherland, Britain? There is a Government which, differing as it does from us in its political and social organization and in territorial position—differing from us as all the monarchies of the Old World do—there is at least one royal Government which, in its chartered rights, its time-honored Parliament, its intellectual greatness, its trial by jury, its *habeas corpus* act, its advancement in commerce, arts, and power, its kindred blood, its municipal law almost identically our own—an American may regard with somewhat of partial interest, so far as he can entertain such a feeling for any thing European. Men are prone to impute to me a sentiment of hostility towards England. Not so. I respect her power; and the very reasons that cause me to respect her power, make me to dread her ambition, and to be jealous of her commercial and colonial aggrandizement. From a small insular state, England has gradually risen to a greatness of power beyond that either of the old Assyrian, Persian, Greek, and Roman empires. On the narrow surface of the British Islands, at once a workshop and a fortress, England has collected and concentrated those extraordinary means of power, whatever they may be, which have enabled her to extend her dominion over the habitable earth, pushing her manufactures and her commerce into every corner of the earth, and making conquests in every clime, combining at once the territorial strength of Rome and the maritime strength of Carthage, with the ambition of both, until she numbers a hundred and fifty millions of subjects, and is become the Queen not of Europe only, but of Asia, and, but for us, of America too. She may now repeat the boast, which old Spain was once so proud to utter, that in her dominions the sun never sets; and of her, the saying of Mr. WEBSTER is as true as it is beautiful, that the beat of the morning drum in her garrisons follows the dawn of day circling around the globe. Seeing all this visible manifestation of the greatness of England, I cannot but watch and dread it; but I must of necessity respect it. And if I seek to know how opulence and greatness are to be achieved, I cannot shut my eyes to the peculiar commercial instruments and the peculiar fiscal agents which England has employed as the means (among other things) of aiding her in the prosecution of her extraordinary career as a nation. I should pro

sume, at least, that the industrial and fiscal machinery, the instrumentality of which she had employed in the attainment of such wonderful wealth and power, must be better than that of Turkey, always barbarous and now half ruined, or of Holland and Spain, which have been losing colonial empires faster than England gains them. And yet it is the fiscal machinery of the former "opulent and enlightened Governments of Europe," and not the latter, which the President calls on us to admire and to imitate!

Thus far, I have considered chiefly the fiscal question of an Independent Treasury; and I come now to the fiscal question of an *Independent Government Currency*. Indeed, I have incidentally referred to this, in discussing the practice of other Governments. What then (as a fiscal, not a political question) ought the Treasury to receive and pay out? Specie only? Or Government paper? Or bank and commercial paper, such as the community at large, and the several States, employ in their receipts and payments?

The Administration talks to us of the enormities of the United States Bank, and the mischief done by the banks of the several States, and then exhorts us not only to dispense with their agency as depositories, but to proscribe their paper; and here again it points us to the example of foreign countries. Let us look at this.

Suppose you had the will and the power to crush all the present banks. Would that put an end to banking? No: for though you should have no bank corporations, you would have bank princes instead, like the Rothschilds and the Barings. But would you rid yourself of paper money? No. Here again the Treasury document concerning the usages of foreign States gives us light; for it shows us how many of the foreign Governments, which employ individual agents exclusively in the safe-keeping of their public treasure, are *paper-money Governments*. Prussia, Saxony, Mexico, as we have seen, and others, have their Government paper. But what need of foreign example? We have no occasion to go to Europe to see how this project of the Administration works. We have the evidence at home. Simultaneously with the sub-Treasury scheme come up *Treasury notes*.

But it is said these Treasury notes are an old agent of the Treasury. They are so. Indeed, they differ in little but the name from the *Continental bills* of the Revolution. After that, we saw no more Government paper, until the period of the last war. Then, as a fruit of the necessities of that day, came these Treasury notes for the first time. And then, also, they came after the expiration of the charter of the first United States Bank. Mark that coincidence. But though the Treasury notes of 1815, like those of 1837, did not essentially differ from the Continental bills of credit, yet the Treasury notes of 1837 and those since issued, are a less disguised Government paper money than the Treasury notes of 1815. Not only were the latter issued as a measure of necessity to meet the war expenditures, but they were issued to be funded, and as a part of the funded debt of the United States. But the Treasury notes of 1837 stand upon their own bottom; they are not a mere evidence of funded debt; they are the original debt itself; and they have been issued, some millions of them at least, at a nominal interest, for the very object of giving them the capacity to circulate as a currency. What is the inference? I know that it is not always easy to distinguish what is mere contiguity of place and contemporaneity of time from what is really cause and effect. I cannot help thinking, however, that, in this case, sub-Treasury is the cause, and Treasury notes are the effect. For, as I observed in discussing the Treasury note bill of this session, every Government must and will have some kind of intermediary between its debtor and itself, and itself and its creditor. No Government, in its senses, will voluntarily subject itself to the risk and trouble of transferring its funds all the time with a military escort from remote provinces to the capital and back again. Even Turkey, as the Treasury Department itself tells us, is willing enough to enjoy the aid of Greek and Armenian bankers in the performance of this operation.

Indeed, in the discussions of the Treasury note bill, it might be seen that the advocates of the sub-Treasury scheme disagree on this point, some of them adhering rigorously to the idea of using specie alone in the dealings of the Government, and excluding not only bank paper, but even Government paper. Such seems to be the idea of one of the distinguished advocates of this measure, (Mr. BENTON,) who has urged it on with so much zeal, industry, and perseverance. Others, with a keener perception of what the Treasury needs, have seen that Treasury notes, or some other forms of Government paper, if not necessary, were at least very convenient in the fiscal operations of the Government. When a Government is in debt, when it has occasion to anticipate its revenues, either bank paper or Government paper is indispensable, as all the European examples show; and sometimes both are found to be convenient, as in the case of England, which uses exchequer bills, as well as Bank of England notes. And, if we are to have no bank paper of any sort, I should hesitate to say that Government paper is not better than none at all, far as regards the fiscal convenience of the Treasury.

But much has been said, by the Administration and its friends, of the losses which the Government has suffered by the receipt of bank paper. No part of this loss, be it observed, has been incurred by the paper of either of the two United States Banks. On the contrary, it occurred in the period of time between the two banks, and by the receipt of the paper of State banks. The amount so lost is estimated by the Treasury Department at five and a half millions. But was

this truly a loss by bank paper? It is the depreciation on the paper of the suspended banks, received at the Treasury during the last war with Great Britain. If a loss, it was a war loss, and a war necessity. But was it a loss by banks? Not at all. The Government needed something with which to pay its sailors and troops, to build and arm its ships, and to buy its munitions of war and mouth; and it was glad to take whatever it could get, bank paper, or any thing else, with which it could meet the calls on the Treasury. The pretended loss by bank paper at that period is no more justly imputable to the banks than the loss on its own paper is. Both were war losses, necessarily incident to the exigencies of the Government.

Finally, so far as regards the fiscal operations of the Treasury, the practical fact, I apprehend, will be this: A portion of the receipts at the Treasury will be in specie, which will go into the vaults and the custody of the Treasurer and his deputies, and will lie there a burden rather than a convenience to the Treasury, or must be transferred to and fro at much cost and risk. But very many of the payments will be made as they now are, by a *check*, or (which is the same thing) an order on a bank or broker for the money. A piece of paper will more or less intervene. The course of things in those countries where the entrepot system prevails illustrates my idea. The importer places his goods in the public store, and when he sells he makes the transfer by an order on the storekeeper, or by assignment of the storekeeper's certificate of storage. Will not some such practice grow up at New York or elsewhere, in the payment of duties in specie? And what will the Treasury gain, in point of convenience, by the operation? Nothing. It is but the substitution of the agency of brokers for that of bankers, or of individual bankers in the place of bank corporations, as in Europe, without advantages of any sort to the Government.

But the fiscal question, which I have been discussing hitherto, is a question of mere *expediency* or Treasury convenience. Is a sub-Treasurer or a bank the safer or better depository of the public funds? Is bank paper unsafe or otherwise unfit as a medium of receipts and payments at the Treasury? And, though the answer to these questions be adverse to the views of the Administration, yet there may be other considerations, great reasons of state, which dictate the adoption of a particular policy, notwithstanding its cost, hazard, or mere inconvenience to the Treasury. And this branch of the subject I proceed next to discuss.

What are those great reasons of state, then, which, notwithstanding that the new financial system, considered as a fiscal agent merely, devolves more expense, trouble, and hazard of loss on the Treasury than the old one, yet call for the adoption of the former by Congress? What are the elements of the political, as distinguished from the fiscal question, involved in the new scheme of policy?

As a political question, this matter regards the power and patronage of the Federal Government; its relation to banks; to bank paper and the currency generally; and to the commerce, agriculture, and productive industry of the nation, as affected by the fiscal action of the Government. It is this part of the subject which chiefly concerns the people of the United States at large, and which is the more frequently insisted on, as a topic of popular discussion, alike by the friends and the opponents of the Administration; and it is entitled, therefore, to careful attention at this time.

It is obvious that, if the bill pass, it will immediately place additional patronage in the hands of the Executive, because it provides for the creation of new and most important and lucrative offices. It will augment the vast army of office holders which the Executive already commands.

It is equally obvious, upon the declarations of the Secretary of the Treasury himself, and the proofs exhibited by him, that it will enlarge immensely the field of speculation, out of which the individual agents of the Government have heretofore reaped so rich a harvest; or, in the language of the Globe, it will expose the public treasure to be plundered by a hundred hands where one cannot reach it now.

Perhaps the scheme involves, on the face of it, less of that indirect Government *influence*, which the Administration was able to exert in 1834 and 1835, by converting the system of the affiliated pet banks into an instrument of party, through appeals to the cupidity of directors, stockholders, and borrowers.

But, on the other hand, the Independent Treasury itself has many of the functions of a bank and so far forth all the power and influence of one.

In the first place, it holds deposits to the amount of some millions always, of the public treasure; and, in that respect, it performs the functions of a bank, precisely in the same way, and precisely to the same extent, as the United States Bank, or the depository State banks, when they were the agents of the Treasury. Whatever amount of public money they held under the old system, the same amount will the sub-treasurers hold under the new one. The power conferred by these deposits will be great at all times, in proportion to the amount so held in deposit. Even as at present, with a revenue unequal to the public expenditure, the President concedes it will be five millions. What will it be in case of a surplus revenue?

Not only does the scheme possess the deposit functions of a bank, but it has paper issue also. I have shown already that, simultaneously with the sub-Treasury scheme, Treasury notes made their appearance, having many of the qualities and uses of a currency, arising as we see from their form as from their receivability at the Treasury in payment of debts and duties to the

Government. I have also shown that, of necessity, paper of some sort must pass between the Government and its debtors or creditors, and if not bank paper, then some form of Government paper. And this bill admits the fact on the face of it. In the 10th section, it is provided :

"And, for the purpose of payments on the public account, it shall be lawful for the Treasurer of the United States to draw upon any of the said depositories, as he may think most conducive to the public interests, or to the convenience of the public creditors, or both."

Here is a paper currency, to a certain amount, more or less. The 16th section enacts :

"That all marshals, district attorneys, and others, having public money to pay to the United States, and all patentees, wishing to make payments for patents to be issued, may pay all such moneys to the Treasurer of the United States, at the Treasury, to the Treasurer of the Mints in Philadelphia or New Orleans, to either of the Receivers-general of public money, or to such other depository constituted by this act as shall be designated by the Secretary of the Treasury, in other parts of the United States, to receive such payments, and give receipts or certificates of deposit therefor."

May not these receipts or certificates of deposit be used in some way as a currency or medium of exchange? To be sure, the bill requires all "disbursing officers or other agents of the Government" (section 21st) to pay out what they receive, and forbids their exchanging Government drafts for any thing but gold or silver; but this restriction applies to Government officers only, not to citizens, who are creditors of the Treasury, as contractors and others. If I contract to do work for the Government, or to supply provisions or any thing else to the army or navy, though the Government pay me in a Treasury draft, it cannot prevent my passing that draft to a bank or to an individual in payment of a debt I owe, or selling it at a premium, and paying my creditor in any thing he may be willing to receive. And the bill (section 23d) also requires the Secretary of the Treasury "to guard as far as may be" against his "drafts being used or thrown into circulation as a paper currency or medium of exchange." But every body knows that this prohibition is in words only. The drafts can and will be used in exchange; and the Treasury cannot, if it would, prevent this. So that the independent Treasury has to a certain extent, and according to the amount of its dealings, the currency functions as well as the deposit functions of the United States Bank.

This Government paper, if all banks are to be done away with, will undoubtedly be so far worth a commercial convenience; but, if banks remain, it will be a mere engine of power in the hands of the Treasury. And it is by the issue of its own paper or of specie, and the refusal to receive bank paper, that the Treasury Department is to exercise influence over the banks and currency of the Union. If the Independent Treasury enables the Department to exercise any influence over the banks and currency, especially if great influence, then it adds in the same degree to the power of the Federal Government. If it has power "to unbank the banks," as has been said, nay if it has but power to restrict and limit their loans and issues, and to reduce their circulation, then is it a tremendous engine of Federal power, as against the States and their institutions. And if it be powerful for any assumed good, it is equally susceptible of power for evil; for that is inherent in the very nature of all power. Or that assumed good may itself be a great evil. Which brings me to the broad question of the general policy of the measure; to answer which requires a deeper exploration of the subject in the various details of its different parts.

What is the professed object of the bill? To establish an *independent* Treasury. Independent of what? Of whom? Of banks? Is that all? No, it is a Treasury independent of the People. The separation from banks is but one branch of the operation. So far as regards the *place of deposit* for the public funds, it is, apparently, a separation from banks only. But it is a very small part of the scheme, though it is the staple of all the argument on the subject, by which the Administration, appealing to the popular jealousy of banks, endeavors to throw dust in the eyes of the People, and to cheat them of their liberties. But the Treasury is to be independent in *things receivable and payable*, independent of the People as well as the banks; it is to have an independent currency, of Government paper or specie, while the People are to have some other currency, unless the general currency of the whole country is to be Government paper or specie.

Will Government paper be the general currency of the country? Such a purpose is disavowed in the bill. And if it were otherwise, the paper issued by the Government, in its dealings, will obviously be insufficient in quantity for the commercial uses of the whole Union. So it cannot be the general currency of the People.

Will specie become the universal currency? No; the quantity in the United States is wholly insufficient to answer this purpose, even if it were practicable (which it is not) to employ specie for all the uses to which a paper currency is now applied. If drawn from abroad, by Government efforts, and against the current of trade, it disturbs the monetary operations, not of this country only, but of the rest of the world, as we saw in 1837, when the Bank of England, alarmed by the forced flow of specie to this country, adopted such violent measures to stop the same, and thus contributed to produce the commercial commotions of that period. And the events of that day show that, in proportion as you force the importation of specie into this country by Government efforts, you disturb the balance of trade, and occasion the most disastrous results. Nay, in proportion as our currency is exclusively a specie currency, in the same pro-

portion does it become identified with foreign causes of uncertainty and change. Every body knows how much of sympathy between country and country, and especially between England and the United States, there now is in all the great operations of commerce; which has led to the saying that the barometer of our markets hangs up in the London Exchange. And, if we have but one and the same currency with them, whatever acts on them acts on us. Conscious of which, the last Administration, when it conceived this idea of a specie currency, and as a part of the scheme, had to adulterate our gold coins and to reduce the fineness of the coinage by greater alloy, so as to keep the coins at home: a fact which illustrates my idea that, if you exclude from circulation all paper of our own, and render our currency wholly metallic, the effect will be to identify still more all our monetary transactions with those of Europe. At any rate, I take it for granted that the quantity of gold and silver now in the United States is altogether inadequate for the extended business relations and the diversified interests of such a country.

To be sure, if it were in the power of the Federal Government to crush all the banks of the States and to exclude from circulation as well their bills and notes as those of individuals,—if it were in the power of the Government to reduce the country and all its business and property to the condition which a limited amount of currency of specie alone would imply,—that would be a very definite and intelligible object, namely, reversing the natural order of things, and restricting the business to the currency, instead of providing a currency for the business. Is that intended? Are we to have a pure specie currency only? Are we to repudiate all credit in trade? To reject the advantages of civilization? To return to the days of barbarism? For I hold it as certain that commercial credit, with the co-operation of paper, in the form of bills and notes, as the representative of money or other property, is one of the results of civilization; that by this, and this only, in the present state of the world, can the complicated and wide-spread affairs of commerce be prosperously conducted: and that a paper medium of exchange is one of the indices of legal stability and of well-ordered freedom in the relations of society and of business. On the other hand, in a state of barbarism, where every thing is insecure, where man distrusts man, and Government and its subjects alike distrust each other,—there is the proper state for a pure specie currency; for he who sells, will sell for nothing but what is immediate and tangible; and he who accumulates, will accumulate only that which is *material*, and so not subject to the chances of legal and social vicissitudes. Thus it is, that, in some parts of Asia, the rich man *invests* his wealth in diamonds and other gems, which he may conceal from the rapacity of his fellow-men and of his Government, because he can trust nobody. Is this what the Administration or its friends desire for the United States? I cannot believe it. I rather imagine that those persons who reason in this sense, and who labor to this end, are actuated by a sort of monomania, and are bewildered by strong mental delusion.

It is conceded, however, by the President and by the more rational of his friends, that an exclusive specie currency is impossible, if it were desirable, and undesirable if it were possible. There is to continue to be, as now, a mixed currency of specie and of paper; and the People are to have, not specie only, nor Government paper only, but something else.

But if the Government are to have Government paper and specie only, and the People something else, then is the Government independent of the People, as I have said from the outset, not in its Treasury only, but *in its currency also*; and that as a permanent system of policy.

And what is the assumed relation between the two currencies? Why, that specie, the superior currency, is to be for the Government, and that the inferior currency of bank paper, drafts, and checks, is to be for the people. Such is the theory preached to us, and such is the precise point to which the theory brings us. And will the people of the United States submit to this?

I have been accustomed to think that the very essence of Democracy consisted in the identification of the Government with the people. This idea of the separation of them—of the giving to the Government either an independent place of deposit for the public revenues, or an independent currency, or independence of the people in any thing else—is a new scheme of democracy altogether. To be sure, there is enough of this among those “opulent and enlightened Governments of Europe” to which Mr. Woodbury refers. There, the Government and the people are more or less separate in their interests. In some, the governed have extorted from the governors, the hereditary princes, and nobles of the land, a portion of political right, as in the constitutional monarchies of Europe; in others, none at all, as in those Asiatic communities where all men (except the prince) are equal, because all men are inferior, and alike without rights. There the Government is independent of the people. But the United States compose a republic of associated republics. Our political organization is republican; our social organization is democratic; and all the influences which pervade the country, social and political, are democratic. And the dearest value of our institutions rests in the principle that the governors and governed are identified in their interests; that the least movement which stirs in the heart beats responsive through the whole frame, and the least touch on a single member sends a sympathetic thrill to the heart. Government and People should sail in the same boat, to sink or swim together. And yet this Administration, professedly, and of set purpose, undertakes to divorce the Government from the People in the matter of currency; to give to the Government a separate and inde-

pendent currency; and to do this, forsooth, in imitation of the *separation policy* of those very monarchies of the Old World, whose political institutions are (or should be) a name of abomination to every true-hearted American!

This Administration idea of the *independency* of the Government, of its separation from the People, dates from the message of the extra session of the last Congress. It proceeded on the assumption that the Federal Government had *no power* to do any thing for the people. For, if the President had admitted the existence of a power to act, he could not have resisted the force of the obligation of the Government to use that power, for the relief of the people, in the midst of evils, the existence and magnitude of which he has conceded. But, he said, the people were in the habit of expecting too much from the Government, which, in the present case, had no power to act.

The theory and the action of the last President had been the reverse of this. He not only assumed the power of the Federal Government to operate on the currency, but he was perpetually overacting; claiming the right, and admitting the duty, and arguing upon the policy of the Government in this matter, throughout the controversy with the United States Bank.

Into the constitutional question of the power of the Federal Government in relation to the currency, I will not enter now; but I cannot forbear to point out the fallacy of an assumption which runs through all the discussions of the Administration and its friends. They talk perpetually of *specie* as the currency of the Constitution. I ask them to show me the word *currency* any where in the Constitution. It is not there, either in express language or by allusion. There was a bank paper currency in the country when the Constitution came into being, which the Constitution left untouched. It did not in express terms provide any currency. It left this for the people or for Congress to provide. All it did in regard to *specie* was, in the first place, to forbid the States to coin money, or to make any thing but gold and silver a tender in payment of debts; and, in the second place, to authorize Congress to coin money and to regulate the value thereof of foreign coin. That is, it fixed a standard of value by which all contracts were to be regulated and prices measured. But it did not provide that coined money, our own or that of foreign countries, should be the *currency* of the United States.

I repeat that I do not intend to enter into any exhibition of my own constitutional opinions in this relation. But the context leads me to investigate further the question of what opinions the Administration holds in the matter, and what its conduct is, compared with its professed opinions. After the many disavowals on the part of the Administration of all power to regulate the currency, or otherwise to interpose in that behalf for the benefit of the people, does the Administration, in its advocacy of this measure of an Independent Treasury, act or speak as if it had no such power? On the contrary, the messages of the President are full of discussions on the currency question and the banks; Mr. Cambreleng's report is replete with considerations of general policy; and all the speeches and newspapers on that side of the question are stark mad with clamor against banks and bank paper. But if your *power* stops at the point of making some fiscal provision for the mere selfish wants of the Treasury, why do you not stop there in your discussions? If you have no power over the currency, then you have no business to meddle with it, if it is not your duty to act, then it is your duty to abstain. If Congress cannot legislate on any given subject, it has no right to agitate on that subject. The abolition question is an example. Be consistent, then. Why, if you have no power of legislation to relieve the people from a disordered currency, and to provide them a better, do you perpetually lecture and exhort, in regard to that which you *profess* to believe appertains exclusively to the several States? Admitting that you have no direct power, will you act by indirection? That would be hypothetical as well as unconstitutional and unjust.

The Globe, last Tuesday, cited authority the very highest, a private letter from Gen. Jackson to the effect that it was the object of this bill to accomplish a great "*financial, commercial and currency reform.*"

Let us have a distinct understanding on this point. Are you engaged in organizing a proper fiscal machinery for the Treasury simply? Or are you engaged in a great commercial and currency reform? If so, by what means, direct or indirect? Have you or have you not the constitutional power to direct, regulate, and control the banks, and to reform and establish the currency? If you have, say so. If you have not, say so. The messages of the President never cease to parade his denial of the power of Congress in this matter. Are we to understand that, though no direct power is given, the end is to be reached indirectly by the use of some other power? If you have the power, direct or indirect, to *reform the currency of the United States*, it concedes the whole question; and if you have the power, I call on you to exercise it, and to bring in a bill at once, expressly, for this "*great financial, commercial, and currency reform,*" to let the interests of the people, not those of the Government, be its primary and principal end and aim. But if you have no such power, then I protest against your talking and arguing as if you had, and thus keeping the whole country in a perpetual fever of anxiety and agitation by the discussion of that of which (as you pretend) the Federal Government has no direct jurisdiction or control. Be one thing or the other, and whichever side you take in profession, take the same action. Your present course has the evils of both, without the benefits of either.

If you persevere in the profession that you have no *direct* powers, then I demand of you to reflect whether, according to your own doctrines, you have any powers at all. I ask the gentleman from New Hampshire (Mr. AHERN) to reflect on this. In the last Congress, the House, on his motion, and by a vote of nearly two-thirds, adopted a resolution beginning in these words: "Resolved, That Congress has no right to do that indirectly which it cannot do directly." Does the constitution give you power to "unbank the banks" by direct legislation? No. Then, "the agitation of the subject" here, "as a means, or with the view, of disturbing or overthrowing that institution (banks) in the States, is against the true spirit and meaning of the Constitution, an infringement of the rights of the States affected, and a breach of the public faith."

There is another question of power involved in this bill, addressing itself more especially to the *ultra* State rights school, if (without any disrespectful meaning) I may be allowed to use this expression.

The object of the bill, as described in the title, is "to provide for the collection, safe-keeping, transfer, and disbursement of the public revenue." No express power appears in the Constitution to pass a bill of such a description; but it *results* from the express power given to Congress to raise and employ a revenue, and the power to pass all laws needful to the due execution of other specific powers. The precise thing, as we have seen, which the bill proceeds "to provide," is a system of individual agents for the "safe-keeping" and the "transfer" of the revenue, and the exclusion of *bank paper* in its "collection" and its "disbursement." Such are the *immediate* objects and the provisions of the bill *in terms*. It is, in the letter, a mere *revenue measure*. But what is it in spirit and ultimate purpose? All the Executive messages and all the speeches and reports in Congress imply, and General Jackson expressly says, it is to effect a great "commercial and currency reform." It is for this that banks and bank paper are to be repudiated in all the transactions of the Treasury. The Government is to receive and pay specie only, in order (indirectly) to reform the currency. Wherein consists this "reform of the currency?" In the regulation and restriction of the banks and bank paper, say some; in their total destruction and proscription, say others. To what object this warfare against banks? It will encourage the planting interest, say some; it will aid the manufacturers, say others. And thus we reach certain *ulterior* objects, which, from the stress laid upon them by the friends of the bill, would seem to be of more importance in their eyes than the narrow question of the fiscal convenience of the system as a Treasury agent.

Now this may be a legitimate mode of legislation. I do not say that it is, or that it is not. What I suggest, however, is, that when, a few years ago, the advocates of protection to manufactures pursued exactly the same mode of legislation, that is, such a use of the *revenue power* in the Constitution as should incidentally promote certain *ulterior* objects for which there appeared no *express* grant of power, the act was on that very ground pronounced by the South to be unconstitutional, null, and void.

For, if it be clear that the Constitution contains no express grant of power to levy discriminating duties in order to encourage particular branches of labor or investments of capital, it is equally clear that it gives no express power to *discourage* any particular form of labor or investment of capital; no express power to regulate banks; to restrict their loans or issues; still less to destroy banks, or to proscribe their paper, and expel it from the community. Nor does it contain any express grant of power to encourage the planting interest, or to aid the manufacturer.

And will you do that indirectly which you have no right to do directly? Will you pass a bill which, though it *purports* to be a revenue act, is claimed and understood to be an act "to unbank the banks?" The South Carolina Ordinance of Nullification, the South Carolina Exposition, the speeches of eminent statesmen of South Carolina, agree that such legislation is a *abusive exercise* of the constitutional powers of Congress; that though the primary object of an act of Congress, the object on its face, be constitutional within the scope of some granted power, yet, if the *ulterior* object, the incidental motive of the act, be the pursuit of a thing not granted, then the act is, nevertheless, a violation of the spirit and true intent of the Constitution.

I assure gentlemen that I cite these documents in no disrespectful sense. On the contrary, I respect the ability which is displayed in them, and the gallantry of their authors. And the identity of the constitutional principle involved in the two cases makes the citation pertinent and proper.

Thus the preamble to the Ordinance speaks of "acts *purporting* to be acts laying duties, &c. but, *in reality*, intended for the protection of domestic manufactures and the giving of bounties to classes and individuals engaged in particular employments, &c." So this bill may be characterized as purporting to be an act to provide for the safe-keeping, &c. of the public revenue, but in reality intended for the indirect proscription of banks, and the imposing of restrictions on classes and individuals engaged in particular employments, and the giving of bounties to other

The Exposition says: "The Constitution may be as grossly violated by acting against its meaning as against its letter." And again: "The Constitution grants to Congress the power of imposing a duty on imports for revenue; which power is abused by being converted into an instrument for rearing up the industry of one section of the country on the ruins of another."

The violation consists in using a power granted for one object to advance another, and that by the sacrifice of the original object. It is, in a word, a violation or perversion," &c. These doctrines apply distinctly to this bill, so far as regards those ulterior objects of a currency reform, or of acting upon banks, or of promoting this or that interest, or discouraging any other, which objects appear to fill the minds and the productions of the friends of the Administration.

And there is a remarkable speech of Mr. Hayne's to the same point. (Senate, April, 1824,) "Will gentlemen suffer me to ask them," he says, "to point out to me, if they can, the power which this Government possesses to adopt a system for the avowed purpose of encouraging particular branches of industry?" And I may add: or of *discouraging* particular branches of industry, such as banking or any thing else. And again: "But, to tell us we have a right to resort to *theoretical speculations*, as to the most convenient or profitable employments of industry, and that you can, by law, encourage certain pursuits and *prohibit others*, is to make this not merely a consolidated but an unlimited Government. If you can control and direct any, why not all the pursuits of your citizens? And if all, where is the limitation of your authority? Gentlemen surely forget that the supreme power is not in the Government of the United States." "Do not these expressions seem as if they were designed for this very bill? How apt is the remark about "*theoretical speculations* as to the most convenient or profitable employments of industry," and the encouragement or discouragement of "*certain pursuits!*" And the whole passage, how emphatically does it not condemn the attempt of this Government to control, by indirection, the pursuits of those citizens of the States who have engaged their industry or invested their capital in the business of banking, under the guaranty of the authorization of the State Governments! Again he says: "But our opponents gravely inform us that *this* is a bill to levy imposts, and that it is, therefore, within the very letter of the Constitution." So here they are gravely told that this is a bill to provide for the safe-keeping and disbursement of the public revenue. But Mr. Hayne replies: "True, sir, if imports (or revenue) were the end and object of the bill. But surely gentlemen will not attempt to justify a departure from the *spirit* by adherence to the *letter* of the Constitution. * * If it be sufficient to adhere to the letter without regard to the spirit and intent of the Constitution, *if we may use a power granted for one purpose for the accomplishment of another and a very different purpose*, it is easy to show that the Constitution on parchment is worth nothing."

These ideas seem to me to be, all of them, exactly apposite to this measure, and the objects intended to be effected by it; since, though the primary and professed object of the present bill, in the case of the tariff bill, be a fiscal one, yet the incidental, indirect, or ulterior object is another, and a very different one. I do not mean to say that I adopt the ideas quoted, for my own use; but I say that if those gentlemen at the South, who have heretofore concurred in the same opinions, abandon them upon this bill,—if, in their action upon this occasion, they admit that Congress may do indirectly what it has no right to do directly,—if they concede here, that "using a power granted for one object, to advance another" is no "violation or perversion" of the Constitution,—if they consent to "abuse" the revenue power now, by converting it into an instrument for rearing up the industry of one section of the country on the ruins of another,—if to-day they can see "the power which this Government possesses, to adopt a system for the avowed purpose of encouraging (or discouraging) particular branches of industry,"—on this occasion, they "attempt to justify a departure from the spirit, by an adherence to the letter" of the Constitution,—if, in fine, they proceed, by enacting this bill, to "use a power granted for one purpose, for the accomplishment of another and a very different purpose,"—then I confidently anticipate, that if, hereafter, it should fall to my lot, in the defence of the interests of my constituents, to maintain the constitutionality and expediency of discrimination in duties on imports for the protection of domestic industry, they will, for consistency's sake, refrain from alleging again, that such legislation is either a violation or a perversion of the constitutional powers of the Federal Government.

Notwithstanding the President and his friends deny to the Federal Government any direct power in these matters, yet they propose to exert power, and to effect a reform, a radical change in the currency by indirection. The points next to be considered, therefore, are, in the first place, are the objects proposed good ones? And, in the second place, whatever their character, are they attained by the passage of this bill?

The primary object, the object of objects, would seem to be, to act upon banks, or, according to the current phrase, *to unbank the banks*.

I do not scruple to say that much of the general clamor against banks, which pervades the reports and speeches of the friends of the Administration is mere extravagance, if nothing more. Take, for instance, Mr. Gouge's pamphlet as a specimen of all that class of matter. He puts together, in a one-sided view, all the evils and losses incident to banks, without any mention of their compensating benefits, and thence infers that banks are injurious to the public. Suppose that precisely the same mode of reasoning were applied to steamboats. Collecting together all the explosions that have ever taken place since the application of steam navigation, with the consequent loss of life and of property, what an appalling picture would be presented to the view! What then? Would you reject the use of steamboats? Have

there not been advantages in the use of them far more than enough to counterbalance the disadvantages? Just so it is with banks.

Again. Admit, for the argument's sake, all that Mr. Gouge says against banks. Is banking to cease? No: all that is to be done is to transfer the business of banking from incorporated bankers to unincorporated bankers; for every nation has bankers and banks of some sort, corporate or unincorporated. What is the difference between the two? So far as regards the bankers themselves, the only difference is in a legal form of association, and the limit of their partnership responsibility. So far as regards the community at large, incorporated banks enable many individuals to have an interest in the stock which would otherwise be confined to a few great capitalists. And the Government, what does that gain by proscribing such banks as we now have in the United States, and rearing up a generation of Rothschilds, Barings, Hope, Lafittes, Aguados, and Trolonias in their place? Who does not know that such men as the Rothschilds have more absolute power in Europe, more influence with Government, more to say on the question of peace and war and the stability or the change of dynasties, than either or the all of the banks in the United States? Even Turkey has her bankers. Even Spain has her Bank of San Fernando. She has, to be sure, little enough of bank paper, or any other of the great instruments of commercial intercourse; and my heart bleeds when I think of that rich and beautiful land and its gallant people, and that long prostration of their industry and commerce, which is hardly a less evil to her than civil war, foreign invasion, or the loss of her Colonies.

What, then, I ask again, is the point of all this never-ceasing clamor against banks? Is it to do away with bankers associated by a charter, and substitute bankers associated by letters of partnership? A small object, truly, for the convulsions and agitations of these ten years. For if banks, in some form, are to continue, and bank paper also, it is a very shallow and superficial course of argument to be all the time indulging in loose generalities about speculation, and inflated credit, and alternate expansions and contractions, and the like. Bring the thing to a practical issue. What is it you wish to do? You say there is an evil: give us the remedy. Is it to destroy the banks? The arguments of many gentlemen aim at that, if they aim at any thing. Is it only to amend them where amendment is desirable, and reform them where they go wrong? If so, I go with you, my constituents go with you. The State of Massachusetts is no friend of bank suspensions. I say with Burke, that "a disposition to preserve, and an ability to improve, taken together, would be my standard of a statesman." But if your object be reform only, you have the constitutional power to reform, why do you not bring in a bill for that express purpose? If amendment of the bank system be your purpose in this bill, why do you not say so? This bill proposes no reform of banks, but their *proscription*, and that alone. Like a grave, it levels all distinctions; for by it all banks, good and bad, specie-paying and non specie-paying, are condemned together, and handed over to the same undistinguishing legal massacre.

Yet, as if absolutely to confound our judgments of what the Administration would, in truth, do, and to cause us to doubt whether, in the midst of all these denunciations of banks, the Administration really intends any thing but to make a parade for popular effect, at the last session of Congress the President, after disavowing any hostility, official or personal, to banks, after referring to his past course on the subject, said:

"I have yet ever wished to see them protected in the exercise of rights conferred by law, and have never done *their utility*, when properly managed, in promoting the interests of trade, and through that channel, the interests of the community. * * * Like other State establishments, they may be used, or not, in conducting the affairs of the Government, as public policy and the general interests of the Union may seem to require. The safe or proper principle upon which their intercourse with the Government can be regulated, is that which relates their intercourse with the private citizen—the conferring of mutual benefits. When the Government can accomplish a financial operation better with the aid of banks than without it, it should be at liberty to seek that aid, and to give the services of a private banker, or other capitalist, or agent, giving the preference to those who will do it on the best terms."

If the banks are of such undoubted utility; if the intercourse of the Government with them is to be regulated on the same principle as that of the private citizens,—the conferring of mutual benefits; and if the Government is to seek their aid whenever it can accomplish a financial operation better with their aid than without it,—if this be so, what becomes of all the general information against banks which pervades and distinguishes the orators attached to the Administration? Another great object of the friends of this bill is, to act upon the currency, independent of or in addition to, the action upon banks, as such.

All candid men admit that the operation of this measure upon the currency is a mere experiment. No one is, or can be, sure that this experiment will succeed any better than that which preceded it. General Jackson overthrew the United States Bank, which did give us a good equal currency of stable and uniform value all over the country. In transferring the public deposits to the banks of the States, he alleged that these would give us a still "better currency" and would, in other respects, meet the wants of commerce. The better to enable them to do this, his friends proceeded to multiply the number of State banks, to supply the place of the United States Bank; and, for the same express purpose, the Secretary of the Treasury (Taney) officially prompted the new deposit banks to enlarge their discounts, and, of course, to increase their circulation. Meanwhile, the Administration was drawing specie from Euro-

order to force a specie currency in the United States. What followed? An excess of credit and of bank paper; a wild mania of speculation in all parts of the United States; a panic among the directors of the Bank of England; a cessation of their discounts to the American trade; a general suspension of cash payments by the banks of the United States; and the utmost disorder in the currency, exchanges, and commerce: This explosion of General Jackson's experiment happening a most at the very instant of his leaving the Presidency. And now comes Mr. Van Buren's experiment. And what is that? By the explosion of General Jackson's, the currency was blown up, and the patient lies prostrate on the ground, his limbs broken, and covered with wounds and bruises. And what does the new state physician propose? Why, to let the patient lie there, writhing and groaning in his agony, to bleed to death, or to get up and get well without help, as he may. Doctor Van Buren will not set a bone or even so much as apply a *plaster* to a wound; and the only remedy for the case seems to be to discharge him, and introduce Doctor Harrison in his place. For, in the message of 1840, as in that of 1837, the President cavalierly turns over this great currency question to the separate jurisdiction of the several States and Territories, twenty-nine independent communities in all, and invites them to remedy the evil. The Federal Government is to do nothing. It folds its arms, whilst the United States needs for its currency, above all other things, that security, of some sort, against the adverse action of foreign interests, and against the irregular and contradictory action of the several States, which the Federal Government alone has the power to afford.

Well, did the several States take care of our currency in the time of the Confederation? Did they, in 1813, when all the banks out of New England suspended specie payments? Did they, in 1837, when nearly all the banks in the United States suspended? Have they taken care of the currency now, when most of the banks South and West of New York are in a state of suspension, and seem likely so to continue we know not how long? When the present suspension began, which of the States threw themselves into the breach to stop the incursion of a paper money currency? Was it the great State of Pennsylvania, with its Van Buren State Administration? Was it the State of South Carolina which presents itself here as the Simon Pure of a hard-money currency? No, it was neither of these; but the Opposition States of New York and Massachusetts which were the first to breast the storm. Yes, it was the much denounced capitalists of New York and Boston who stopped the tide of paper money, and prevented it from overflowing the whole land in the same common deluge. The gentleman from New Hampshire (Mr. ATHERTON) says,—what of New Hampshire? I reply, New Hampshire, to be sure, acted with us in Massachusetts; and it could not well have done otherwise had it been otherwise minded; for it was the mass of capital in Boston and New York which saved the banks of the Eastern States. We, in Massachusetts, do not profess to be specie currency men, but we generally give all we can to pay our debts, understanding that to be good policy as well as honesty. And we should find it much easier than we do to worry along under the difficulties of the present crisis, if the States in the South and West, which, by their Representatives here, profess so much readiness for a specie currency, would pay us what they owe, either in specie, or, what we should be very glad to take if we could get it, in good convertible bank paper. And if those States, which, by their hard-money votes here, aid the Administration to oppress the whole Union, could carry the same hard-money theories into the practical action of their State Legislatures, they would then give some countenance to the President's doctrine, that each State by itself, and not the Federal Government, is to adjust the currency question.

If the Representatives from those States will take it in good part, it will be edifying to consider what their Legislatures have done of late towards the restoration of a sound currency. Alabama—she has a majority of members here supposed to be friendly to this bill; and has she taken measures for a resumption of specie payments? No, but the contrary, as I understand, in granting an extension of time, on the debts due to her banks. Tennessee—she has a Van Buren State Administration, which refused to require her banks to resume. Georgia, the same. South Carolina, the same. Virginia, I trust she is a Whig State; but she has a majority of Representatives here friendly to the Administration; and do her banks (ay, and State banks too) use specie? Not at all. In short, the sum total is this: too many of the States, while, as States, they practise paper money in all its forms, and thus contribute their utmost to disorder the currency, come here as hard-money States, and thus enable the Administration to tighten its noose around the necks of the rest of us, who, if they would practise what they profess, could do for ourselves, or, if they would profess what they practice, could, with their aid, compel the Federal Government to hear to reason.

Therefore, we are to judge of the currency policy of the Administration by existing facts, if the policy is bad enough at best,—whether, as the President seems to think, the amendment of the currency is to be left to the States themselves,—or whether, as many of the friends of this bill declare and argue, one of its objects be to effect a “currency reform,” by the proscription of bank paper and bank paper from the business of the Treasury.

One class of persons profess devotion to an exclusive specie currency; others profess that all they wish is to enlarge the specie basis of bank paper; while most persons, among the orators and writers of the Administration, content themselves with general declamation against bank paper, without proposing any thing important of a practical nature. Amid all the clashing

opinions of the day, there is probably less difference on this subject, in the minds of discreet persons, than is generally imagined. That the specie hobby is all naught, is very clear; that suspended banks and irredeemable bank paper are quite wrong, is equally clear. And it is full time the currency question was withdrawn from politics, and settled upon the true principle, that the essence of a good currency is uniformity with stability and sufficiency, it being less material *what* it is, if it be *such*. And this brings me to another division of the objects and assumed benefits of this measure; which is, its effect on commerce; for General Jackson, as quoted by the *Globe*, tells us it is to effect a commercial as well as currency reform.

Commerce being the exchange of commodities, in order to prosper, it needs, first, a medium of direct payment, sufficient in quantity, fixed in value, and, as near as may be, equal in all parts of the country; secondly, for remote operations, where payment is to be made, not from hand to hand, but by bills of exchange, then a rate of exchange, reasonable in amount, and the lower the better; and thirdly, commercial credit and mutual confidence. Whenever, for any cause, the currency and exchanges are insufficient or bad, and confidence or credit is disturbed, in such circumstances commerce of necessity labors.

Now, if the object of the Administration be to establish an exclusive specie currency, the result must be, as I have heretofore argued, either that the currency will be insufficient to carry on the commerce of the country in its present state, and thus will fail to perform its proper office, or the commerce must be cut down to that currency, and so be crippled and paralyzed. If the object of the Administration be, that we should depend upon the bank bills of the States, in that case we have a currency, as the present state of things shows, neither stable nor uniform. The Administration excludes, professedly at least, the idea of Government paper as well as United States Bank paper; so that, in fact, nothing remains except the paper either of the banks of the States, unequal and irregular as it is, or the paper which individuals might issue under a system of free banking. How the latter would operate is a mere speculation; for, though it has been proposed, yet it is an untried experiment, in regard to which there is an almost total absence of ascertained or conclusive facts. At any rate, I do not understand that the Administration takes up this plan; and our commerce remains, therefore, so far as regards the currency, surrounded with the present difficulties, in which the empirical schemes of the Administration have involved us, with the certainty that it still persists in those schemes, but without any certainty as to what are in truth its precise aims and ends.

And so as to the exchanges. Their equality in the time of the United States Bank is an historical fact, which stands forth in striking contrast with their present inequality, under the tinkering of the Government, and the disorganized condition of the State banks. The Administration does not, that I can perceive, propose any thing whatever to meet this difficulty, except in so far as the Government paper, provided for in this bill, may serve to that end. But the amount of aid to the exchanges to be derived from this source is confined within very narrow limits. This consists, in the first place, of the revenues of the Post Office, amounting to say five millions of dollars, but which now, as heretofore, goes chiefly to pay the mail contractors, and is therefore of no use in commerce. It consists, in the second place, of the payments at or from the Treasury, equal in amount, at most, to the sum annually expended by the Government, say thirty million dollars, a part of which may enter, in one way or another, into commerce, though in doing so it will run counter to the professed object of the bill, which enjoins upon the Secretary of the Treasury to keep his drafts out of circulation as far as may be; because, if they enter largely into circulation, then, as I have before argued, the Independent Treasury is a Government Bank. And this remark applies to any other miscellaneous form of Government drafts or receipts which may grow up out of the operations of the Treasury.

Whilst in all these particulars the commerce of the country derives little aid from the financial schemes of the Administration, and is on the contrary greatly obstructed and injured by them, in another respect, also, it suffers infinitely under the policy of the Government. Confidence and credit, which are the basis of all prosperous commerce, are struck at directly by the Administration, in the holding of so much public treasure, which under this bill is to be locked up in the vaults of the Treasury, and so withdrawn from business, either for direct use, or for use as a basis of bank issues; contrary to the opinion expressed by General Jackson himself, in one of his messages, to the effect that locking up the public treasure in this way is a positive wrong done to the people. Confidence and credit are struck at indirectly by the Administration in the destructive and radical doctrines which many of its partisans utter, alarming capitalists, and checking their operations; as also in those many of the acts or declarations of the Administration denigratory of the banks, which are thus held in perpetual terror of runs for specie, of the withdrawal of their charters, and of bankrupt laws for their particular destruction. Commercial credit is struck at by the Administration directly, and at the tenderest point, in the wild declamation of its partisans against the use of borrowed capital:—the strangest of all things to come from the professors of democracy, since credit is the only means by which the industrious and enterprising poor man is able to trade at all, and without which all the gains of commerce would be monopolized by rich capitalists alone, instead of being diffused through the community wherever industry and integrity exist, as they have been and will be under the influence of any just and proper system of confidence and credit, unembarrassed by the crudities of a mischief-making Government.

But eminent advocates of the Administration are found, who claim for this bill the merit of being a boon to the productive industry of the country, who urge this as among the objects to be promoted by it, and the motives for its enactment. Though the currency is disordered by the policy of the Administration, and exchanges too; and though the internal commerce of the country is in a most languishing state, and agriculture and manufacture, which are so dependent on commerce, suffer in its train; yet this bill is to advance the productive industry of the United States. And how? By reducing, or tending to reduce, the cost of production, which is one day said to be advantageous to the planter, and the next to the manufacturer.

Now, supposing any such advantage to accrue from the operation of this bill on currency and bank paper, (which is the argument,) to whose particular profit is it to inure? Plainly to that of the manufacturer-capitalist, and the planter-capitalist, at the expense of the laborers hired or employed by each; that is, of the great mass of the community. The capitalist-undertaker, whether in planting or manufacture, is *to get his work done cheaper*, and thus to have the cost price, of the article raised or manufactured, less. Thus, the merchant is to have a ship built cheaper, not by obtaining at any less price the *foreign* hemp, iron, sail-cloth, and copper, which constitute so large a part in cost of all her materials, but by paying less to the carpenters. This, and this alone, is the result of reducing the cost of production to a specie standard. So of an invoice of goods manufactured, or any thing else; the production is to cost less to the capitalist, by the mechanics receiving less, under a specie currency, or an approximation to that. I put it to gentlemen to speak out, and say, whether this be not the true mode in which a reduction of the cost of production will work, and, if so, whether this be just and equal, and for the good of the Many.

But I may be asked, if this be the operation of the bill, why do not the capitalists, North and South, unite in the support of it? I reply, for my constituents, that they would disdain to receive from the Government a supposed benefit, which is to the general prejudice of the community as a body, in the general injury of which they would lose more in the end than they would gain by the supposed advantage to themselves in the beginning. Nor do they believe that, in the long run, any advantage is to accrue to them separately. Their best interest is in the prosperity of the whole community. Though, by the payment of all duties in specie, the relative amount of the protecting duty on manufactures were to be in a small degree augmented, and the cost of production some little diminished by the reduction of the price of labor to a specie standard, yet the manufacturer, or other producer, is no better off than before, without there be regular and equal exchanges and currency with which to carry on his operations, and without there be such general prosperity of all branches of business as may insure to him a steady demand for consumption, and a consequent steady market for the sale of his merchandise.

It remains only that I advert to the question, whether, whatever may be the ulterior and incidental objects of the Administration, be these good or bad, they will be attained by the passage of this bill.

Does the Administration really desire to accomplish those objects—any of them—and if so, which of them? I profess that I cannot tell. Its own precise ends are so covered up in the obscurity of mere generalities, and of intangible abstractions, now swinging over towards the specie currency school, and now again back to the bank interest, that I doubt whether it knows itself what mark it would have the pendulum to rest. For instance, would the Administration destroy bank corporations? When I see how prone its friends are to grow rabid and almost foam at the mouth at the very name of a bank,—when I reflect that declamation against banks constitutes the staple of all they say,—and when I call to mind the wild visions of a general specie currency, which some of the more zealous, or it may be the more sincere of its friends, have entertained and avowed,—at such times I might suppose that it intended to make root and branch work with all banks whatever; for otherwise the effusion of so much wordy fury against them is idle, absurd, undignified, and unjust. But, then, on the other hand, the President tells us that he *never doubted the utility* of banks. Again: while some of the friends of the Administration are thus frantic in their denunciation of banks, others are found, who take pains to assure that they have no sentiments of hostility whatever towards those institutions. Nay, as I mentioned before, it happens that not a few of those States which give utterance, through their State governments or their Representatives here, to the greatest quantity of bank denunciation, are themselves, as States, inseparably identified with banks of their own. What conclusion is a man to come to under such circumstances, as to that which the Administration really intends?

But if the Administration really intends to proscribe banks and bank paper, as this bill professes, and as the words (but not the acts) of its friends declare, and if its object be to effect a “currency reform,” has it the power to do this? Can it stand the shock of individual interests? Will it are to enter into conflict with the power of the States, so many of which are directly and largely interested in banks? Will those States consent to a bankrupt law, for instance, to embrace their banks? I doubt it. Some affect to believe this; but I do not. In a word, too many of the objections behind this bill, which are *professed* by the friends of the Administration, are morally, politically, and physically impracticable, and too evidently so, for me to repose much trust in the faith of the measure.

And if this Administration is bent upon the accomplishment of those ulterior objects, the discussion of which is by so many of its friends associated with this bill, will it continue in power long enough to effect them? That is a question which time only can determine.

Certain it is, that some of the most intelligent friends of the Administration begin themselves to betray a distrust of the efficacy of this bill for any ulterior good, by the language in which they deny its efficiency for evil. Thus, the Boston Morning Post, a principal Administration journal in the East, says, recently:

"The Government has now no deposits, and has had none for a long time; and it matters little where the few scattering dollars unexpended are kept. *They have had, and can have, no effect upon the country, one way or the other.*"

And the Democratic Review, in the last number, says:

"Though the immediate influence of this reform upon the currency of the country will be but slight, notwithstanding the most exaggerated views taken of it by both friends and foes, yet, upon the future action of the Government, it will impress itself with an effect as potent as salutary."

Here is the distinct avowal that the immediate influence of this measure on the currency will be *but slight*; and that the views of its friends, as well as foes, are *most exaggerated*. I sometimes incline to this opinion myself. It corresponds with a view of the subject which has been very ably and forcibly presented by Mr. Charles F. Adams, son of my colleague, in several publications of his, which charge upon the Administration, as its great fault in the matter, its culpable abnegation of the just powers of the Federal Government in this behalf, and its consequent total abandonment of its duty to the people. For, after so many years' discussion of this measure by the Administration, it seems now to be chiefly used by it as a mere stalking-horse of party, and as an instrument of party ascendancy. In this respect, the Democratic Review is right in saying that upon the future action of the Government, if successful, it will impress itself with *potent* effect; whether a salutary one, is another question, and depends upon causes and influences wholly beyond the control of this or of any other Administration.

For, even upon the premises assumed by the Administration, and conceding all it asks, the utility of the measure, or rather, the more or less quantity of mischief in it, depends, in the first place, on the singleness and integrity of purpose of its administrators and the abjuration of all party influences by them; and when was there a time that this Administration was disposed, or, if disposed, was able, to act independently of party considerations and with a single eye to the good of the country? And the more or less of mischief that it may do depends, also, upon the state of the Treasury. Consider what would be the condition of the country, if we had a large surplus revenue locked up in the Treasury vaults. It would withdraw all specie from circulation. Nor is this an imaginary evil. Whatever disposition Congress or the Executive may have to keep the revenues down to the expenditures, and to keep the latter as low as possible, that is a problem the equation of which was never yet found for a length of time by any Government. Nothing is of more difficulty than to predict the precise quantity of revenue derivable from a given state of taxation. Sometimes a high rate of impost diminishes importation so as to dry up the revenue from a given article; and sometimes a low rate of duty augments the importation so as to make the aggregate of tax received on it large beyond all anticipation. Mr. Woodbury himself, on one occasion, (report of December, 1834,) with all the lights which the Treasury Department possesses on this subject, erred in his calculations to the amount of the difference between twenty millions and thirty-five millions, in the revenue of a single year. And though, in the remarks which I have been making on this bill, I have assumed, for argument's sake, the correctness of the President's idea that the amount of specie which this bill is to lock up in ordinary years will be only five millions, yet I greatly distrust the calculation. For the amount of public deposits in the United States Bank, and afterwards in the State banks, greatly exceeded this, for a long series of years. (Senate Doc. 1st sess. 23d Cong. No. 16, p. 5; House Doc. 2d sess. 24th Congress, No. 77.)

Suppose, then, a large amount of revenue on hand, and this in bad hands, in the custody of persons disposed to use the Treasury for purposes of influence and power. In such hands, and in such circumstances, the power conferred by the bill would be stupendous. It would give to the Administration, which might choose so to employ it, control of all the business of the country, and, by the combination of political power and money power, fix and establish that administration in the possession of the Federal Government. One cause of the failure of the State bank deposit system, and perhaps the chief cause, was its being not only mal-administered, but mixed up with the interests of party and of power. What is to prevent the same personal interests and party passions from fastening themselves on this system, to accomplish the same selfish ends? Nothing, so long as the same men and the same motives direct the councils of the Federal Government.

The Administration, it may be, has a majority of members here disposed to pass this bill, though whether that majority is not obtained by the chance result of a question of returns, and whether it represents a majority of the People of the United States, remains to be seen. For this measure is now under discussion before the People, who are becoming fully awake to the importance of the questions involved in it, and will themselves pass judgment thereon at the coming elections. Mr. Van Buren has staked his political fortunes upon this measure. Won

not his friends best consult his and their interests, and the welfare of the country, by leaving the fate of this bill to be decided by the People themselves, instead of endeavoring to forestall their judgment?

They may hope to gain something, in a party view, by the passage of this bill now, in the expectation that it will immediately produce a settled state in the relations of business. I think, in this, they are mistaken, if such be their expectation. I myself have been half inclined at times to say to the Administration: Pass your bill; fix your Independent Treasury and Independent Currency upon the country; take the money empire to which you aspire, if that will content you, so that the business interests of men may be relieved from the anxiety and suspense of this never-ceasing political agitation, and give us a certainty at last, though it be the certainty even of death itself to the industry and enterprise of the country. But, on further reflection, I saw clearly that, if the bill passes, it does not give to business men even this poor benefit, of at length knowing their fate; for its passage brings no certainty with it. It will not aid the suspended banks to resume, for instance. Pennsylvania, Alabama, Mississippi—these, or any other States, will not be restored by it to a sound and steady currency. Nay, General Jackson tells the whole nation, in his recent letter to the Ohio committee, that “an end to the evils of a depreciated paper currency” is to be reached, not by the establishment of the Independent Treasury only, but when, “in addition to this reform in our financial system,” Congress shall, “at the same time, pass a general bankrupt law,” embracing both “the banks which are now in existence, or may be hereafter chartered by the States.”

So that we are not to see land until that event happens. Will this Congress pass such a bankrupt law? Ask those of the States which are identified with their banks, whether they stand ready to pass under a commission of bankruptcy. If they can bear the operation, we in the specie-paying States can well do it. And if a commission of bankruptcy is to issue, to wind up, and distribute the assets of all those banks which, in the words of the letter just quoted, “refuse to redeem their notes in specie,” I ask gentlemen in the Middle and Southern States, from Pennsylvania to Georgia, in how short a time that operation can be completed? In three months? No, nor in three years. And meantime, whilst all the suspended banks are in the custody of commissioners of bankruptcy winding up their affairs, what becomes of the business of the country? Will that enjoy the repose and certainty which some gentlemen promise to themselves is to follow the enactment of this law? We know that, on the contrary, there will be such a crash and confusion of all business interests in the performance of that operation as his country has never yet witnessed.

Apart from all which, there is the question, whether, in the course of a few months, a new Administration may not come in, either to administer this law with feelings and purposes different from those of its author, or, it may be, to repeal it, before a new set of interests shall have had time to gather themselves around it. Under these circumstances, it is clear that the mere passage of this bill cannot produce any such settled condition of business as to aid the present Administration at the polls, or to justify the Opposition in voluntarily yielding to its enactment. I have conceived it to be my duty, therefore, with my convictions of its impolicy, to resist this measure to the last. In so doing, I act in conformity with the opinion of the State of Massachusetts, as expressed by her Legislature, and as entertained, I fully believe, by the great majority of her People. I ask the Clerk to read the following resolutions of the General Court of Massachusetts, approved by Gov. Everett, on the 30th March, 1838, viz:

“Resolutions of the Legislature of Massachusetts, relating to the sub-Treasury.”

Resolved, That the sub-Treasury bill, by making no provision for furnishing a currency in and between the several States, fails of performing a duty authorized by the Constitution, and demanded by the interest of the whole country.

Resolved, That the sub-Treasury bill would, by withdrawing from circulation large amounts of specie, diminish the basis on which State institutions are founded, place them in too great a degree in the power of the General Government, deprive them of the means of extending usual and necessary facilities to those engaged in commerce and manufactures, and, by causing distrust, have a direct tendency to postpone the resumption of specie-payments.

Resolved, That the sub-Treasury bill, by giving to the Government and its officers a different currency from that provided for the People, and by increasing the power and patronage of the Executive, is hostile to the genius, and may be destructive to the permanence, of our republican institutions.

Resolved, That his excellency the Governor be requested to forward copies of the above resolutions to our Senators and Representatives in Congress, and that they be desired to use all proper and honorable means to prevent the bill in question from becoming a law.”

These resolutions of the State of Massachusetts have been my guide in the course of argument. I have endeavored to present to the House. They indicate the precise line of distinction between the views of the Administration and those of the Opposition: the Opposition maintaining the policy of identity of interest between the Government and the People, and the duty of the former to act for the welfare of the latter; and the Administration pushing to the utmost the doctrine of a separation of interest between the Government and the People, the giving to the latter not only a Treasury independent of the banks, but a currency independent of and controlled by that of the People and of the States. And in conclusion I have this only to say, that those who place the most confident reliance on the integrity and intelligence of the People; that who believe it is the right as well as the responsibility to decide this question; and whatever their decision may be, I shall bow with respectful submission to their will, as that of the true ultimate sovereign power in these United States.

The first part of the paper is devoted to a general discussion of the problem of the origin of life. It is shown that the problem is one of the most important and interesting in the history of science. The author discusses the various theories of the origin of life, and shows that the most probable one is the theory of spontaneous generation. This theory is based on the fact that life is everywhere, and that it is impossible to find a place where it does not exist. The author also discusses the question of the origin of the first living organisms, and shows that the most probable one is the theory of the origin of life from non-living matter. This theory is based on the fact that the elements of life are everywhere, and that it is impossible to find a place where they do not exist. The author also discusses the question of the origin of the first living organisms, and shows that the most probable one is the theory of the origin of life from non-living matter. This theory is based on the fact that the elements of life are everywhere, and that it is impossible to find a place where they do not exist.